Palmer Factory Update

[Pierre Maertin]

 

News Update Commentary – The R.M. Palmer Factory Explosion  
By Pierre Maertin

 

As featured in our earlier segment, “Industrial Negligence or Capital Liquidity?” West Coast Midnight Run™ continues its coverage of this industrial accident at West Reading, Pennsylvania.  The current investigation into the cause of the explosion at R.M. Palmer Chocolate Factory made news again today revealing that poor gas line pipe workmanship and known fittings to be of poor quality had fractured, possibly leading to the explosion.

 

 

Current investigators from the NTSB were as of the date of this writing inconclusive and still struggling with the determination of the cause of the explosion.

 

As an engineer who has worked on the design of utilities systems for industrial facilities including petroleum refineries, it is difficult to believe that a fractured fitting was all it took for a fatal explosion of this magnitude to take place. Any high pressure gas line is subject to a HAZOP review before installation by the contractor. The review takes place by a team of design engineers before finalizing the project documents for issuance to construction.

 

Not only does a HAZOP review look at any hazardous operations issues, but there is also a Life Safety Review and a Criticality Review that are either independently conducted or simultaneously performed during the HAZOP review phase of the project.

 

SMALL HIGH PRESSURE FITTINGS?  FITTINS AVAILABLE

At issue here is the contention that a high pressure gas line would normally be equipped with a pressure line sensor, so that if a fitting or flange or any part of the pipeline bursts or cracks (as described in the news report) this event would result in an immediate pressure loss in the line detected by several pressure sensors that relay the information to an automated and motorized shut off or cut-off valve. Basically within seconds or fractions of a second of the line losing significant pressure, indicating some kind of problem, sensors would trigger the safety shut off valve or several shut off valves (depending on the system design) would go into action and prevent such a devastating incident from happening in the first place. The same said sensors would also trigger alarms (audible and visual) in the facility where lives might be endangered. In addition to gas pressure sensors, typical safety features would be gas sensors that identify the hazardous chemicals when their concentration exceeds normal operating parameters.

 

Were these kind of typical safety features designed by the engineers of record before being presented to city officials for review and final approval before construction is made? Did the contractors modify the systems during construction and if they had somehow gamed the safety features, did they submit their as-builts to the inspectors for approval? Finally, if both the design firm and the construction contractors did their jobs properly, were the systems modified by the maintenance crew of a maintenance contractor and were such modifications presented to the design firm or the city offices for review and approval before maintenance modifications were implemented?

There are many possible intrusions on the safety systems that ought to have been in place and while the present news reports are pointing the blame at the gas company UGI for installing a fitting from a manufacturer known to be prone to cracking (itself criminally negligent), the actual liability may ultimately fall on the shoulders of the maintenance contractor and/or the Fire Department/City Hall who are tasked with conducting regular operational safety reviews and should have noted the faulty fitting, either during installation and review (before commissioning by the gas company) or shortly after installation. Typically these kind of systems are not the responsibility of the gas company, city inspectors have final say and can shut down the systems in question during installation until remedial action is taking.

 

SOMETHING IS OFF IN OZZ LAND

The press has not featured nor mentioned in any way the supposed safety systems that should be in place at the factory, from clunky and outdated to state-of-the-art, these would be some of the biggest talking points in any news report and yet for some odd reason, dear readers are the judge, there is no mention of them.  In industrial accidents, safety systems and their functioning, malfunctioning are the focal subject of any investigation.  Yet there aren’t any in the news reports that were published by news outlets from months ago, when the explosion took place, and to this date.

 

So far, the regional press covering the story might be pointing the blame in the wrong direction. Stay tuned, we will keep you updated as more details become available.

 

Pierre E. Maertin, PE
Mechanical Engineer
(CA State License)

 

All contents © 2023 for West Coast Midnight Run™.  All rights reserved.

[Dave2000]

I showed this to a buddy of mine, he is a Virginia DOT Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) construction contractor, FYI for some reason he does not like your publication says its a useless pile of crap nothing useful for construction pros, yadda yadda blah blah blah…

anyways in his opinion, UGI would be to blame since they probably managed the construction contractor that installed that gas line and fitting (if the news reports are accurate), he doesnt see it as the city inspectors’ fault, it’s really on UGI’s shoulders, in most instances the utility is the manager directing the work of the contractor and (cough cough) the city or district likes them as the fall guy, end of story!

[Spidey Gamma]

Doesn’t matter what your friend said, I am having a problem with this heap of BS thrown at the “woke public”, why on earth would the gas utilities company install a fitting known to fail???  UGI is a big utility not some popcorn and flowers push cart at the mall.  Anyone who has worked with industrial groups, manufacturers or service providers like cable and fiber optic groups knows how rigorous quality control is on their systems and installations, and fiber optic is a non-explosive non-lethal product unlike gas or flammable substances.  I don’t buy the arguments from NTSB and other parties dishing out their gaslighting opinions.  Anyone else wants to join Dave and his friend?  Be my guest!   👎@Dave2000

[Spidey Gamma]

I am having a problem with the fact that employees reported a gas odor in the plant, weeks before the incident, several, yet no one managed to yank the alarm bells with responsible agencies?  The plant has safety personnel, and they know how serious a gas leak on a factory floor, yet NO ONE DID ANYTHING???  No one did any whistle blowing?  News says employees RESIGNED their jobs about a full month or more before the accident because of the gas odors on the factory floor.  How serious are these reports?  what kind of people resign and yet do not call federal or state agencies for an anonymous tip or to whistleblower the situation?  The stories in the news reek of absolute nonsense.

[Lennie Deakens]

I keep looking at the broken gas fitting in the picture from the NTSB.  I do not recognize the material.  It looks like garden variety PVC pipe with double wall, but I can not believe it would be PVC for a high pressure gas line.  I cannot believe the NTSB would do shoddy work after several months, there should have been more information released to the press.

[Gerald Fuller]

can you for a moment imagine what it must have been like for those employees inside in the first second of the explosion? just gruesome and those not close to the epicenter of the explosion, the shock, the ear drums that got blown, I imagine the force of the blast must have caused concussion level damage to the survivors, and I think not just ear drums, but eye sockets are super sensitive, I once had a mild fender bender whiplash and my eyes were hurting like crazy in their sockets, small eye muscles and veins can be strained or torn.  Just horrible and incredibly difficult to fanthom the shock these people got.  I just can’t wish them enough well wishes in their ordeals of recovery.

[Drake Teng]

I was only there for a few months on the ground floor so I never saw that much of the building. Everyone I knew who worked there said the place was a fire hazard, decrepit, and unsafe. They tried selling both their buildings to Hershey, who wanted nothing to do with the West Reading building, and it’s shit like this that made it a smart move on their part not to bother with it.

[Fred Donnelly]

did you also work at Hershey, so you can give us comparisons?

[Fred Donnelly]

when is the follow up piece coming?  give us some hard-hitting facts, right now you’ve been telling us what should be in the factory to prevent the accident, but the accident happened, so give us something that we can chew on.  Martin says its the city inspectors, maybe I am reading this wrong but I get the feeling he is pointing the finger squarely at them.  Your next piece should clearly articulate the facts and conclusions, not what should have been.  In your opinion, who is the guilty party?

[StarTresQ]

This has one very OBVIOUS thing written all over it:

When Chief Engineer Scotty SCREWS UP!!!!  🤔

<span class=”r-18u37iz”>#StarTrekStrangeNewWorlds</span> <span class=”r-18u37iz”>#StarTrekOnline</span> <span class=”r-18u37iz”>#startrekfans</span> <span class=”r-18u37iz”>#startrekfandom</span> <span class=”r-18u37iz”>#fandom</span>

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